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This paper integrates literature on social movements and migration to examine how migration 
shapes both the cognitive and social foundations of collective action in origin communities. 
Using longitudinal data and in-depth interviews from rural China, we find that outward migration 
spurs collective resistance in origin communities and shapes the form and scale of collective 
action. Migration fosters non-institutionalized rather than institutionalized collective action, 
because it induces relational diffusion that empowers peasants to mobilize and employ more 
effective resistance strategies. This holds more for small- and medium-size collective action than 
for large-scale mobilizations, mainly because out-migration can also trigger community 
disintegration that inhibits larger-scale action. Furthermore, local social institutions condition the 
role of migration: migration has a stronger positive impact in close-knit villages embedded in 
strong lineage networks than in less cohesive villages. We contextualize the findings against the 
distinct institutional arrangements in China, which were originally engineered to disenfranchise 









Domestic and overseas migration are ever-growing phenomena with implications for both 
receiving and sending communities (Collier 2013). Previous research has demonstrated the 
complex ways in which migration promotes or impedes economic and social development in 
origin communities (Eckstein and Najam 2013). Migration, which flows disproportionately 
toward more developed and democratic settings, often coincides with political change in origin 
societies. How that process occurs remains an open question. This article shifts an earlier focus 
on the economic and social effects of migration on origin communities to its political 
consequences. In doing so, we bring together two fields that have largely developed separately—
migration and social movements. This approach reflects the increasing recognition that 
demographic phenomena at the micro and macro level, such as migration, can shape the 
dynamics of political contention (Goldstone and McAdam 2001; Goldstone, Kaufmann, and Toft 
2012).  
The nature of contemporary migration calls for a new way to conceptualize the effect of 
migration beyond the existing framework of “exit and voice.” Early exit-voice theory views the 
two strategies as mutually exclusive: emigration (exit) serves as a safety valve to relieve local 
pressure and, in the process, undermines collective action (Hirschman 1970). A revised 
formulation of the theory sees exit as spurring voice by signaling the extent of discontent (Pfaff 
and Kim 2003). Both lines of research emerged from the study of political exit, which entails the 
complete uprooting and limited repatriation of politically-active individuals. Today’s migrants 
are driven primarily by economic rather than political concerns (World Bank 2014). They may 
be “permanent settlers, temporary ‘guest workers,’ circular ‘birds of passage,’ return migrants to 
their homeland, or some combination of those categories at different points in the life course” 
	 3 
(FitzGerald 2012, p. 1726). These fluid circumstances prompt migrants to maintain connections 
and allegiances with their homelands. One would thus expect different, more dynamic, social 
processes linking migration with political developments in areas of origin. 
In the present study, we integrate literature on social movements and on migration to 
develop and empirically test a conceptual framework linking contemporary migration and 
collective action. Whereas previous research tends to adopt a unidirectional view, seeing 
migration as either beneficial or detrimental to development, we offer a more comprehensive and 
nuanced understanding of the relationship. First, we propose that migration can have competing 
effects on the likelihood of collective action in origin communities because it shapes the 
cognitive and social foundation of social movements in opposing directions. In cognitive terms, 
migration can produce relational diffusion through the transmission and brokerage of “political 
remittances” along established social ties (Levitt 2001; Goldring 2004; Kapur 2010). This 
empowers people remaining in origin communities and engenders the "cognitive liberation" that 
is critical for collective action (McAdam 1982). However, a social consequence of migration 
may be community disintegration, whether resulting from population depletion, erosion of 
community solidarity, or disengagement (De Haas 2010; Eckstein and Najam 2013). This 
undermines the community's mobilizing capacity. In these respects, migration simultaneously 
fosters and stymies collective action. 
Second, we contend that the cognitive and social processes driven by migration affect not 
only the likelihood but also the nature of collective action, including its form and scale. 
Migration-driven relational diffusion exposes people in origin communities to new, broadened 
repertoires of contention, which subsequently inform their tactical choices. At the same time, 
changes in the social structure can affect the scale of collective action, especially to the extent 
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that the process of disintegration severely weakens the community’s capacity for large 
mobilization. 
Third, because of these competing forces, the overall impact of migration may not be 
uniform and should be understood within its local social-institutional context. We propose that 
preexisting social institutions interact with migration patterns to affect the likelihood and nature 
of collective action. Established social institutions, particularly solidarity-based institutions, can 
reinforce relational diffusion from migrants to origin communities while shielding against 
community disintegration. The combination of indigenous social resources from established 
institutions and external political resources from migrants contributes in distinct yet 
complementary ways to collective action. 
We study the political impact of migration in China, which has undergone two profound 
transformations in recent decades: massive rural-to-urban migration (Liang, Li, and Ma 2014) 
and growing collective resistance1 across the country (Cai 2010) (Appendix A displays the two 
trends). Despite these parallel transformations, collective resistance in rural China is rarely 
discussed in connection with migration. China also offers a useful setting for understanding how 
institutional context structures the dynamics and subsequently the influence of migration. 
Chinese migrants face distinct institutional conditions that impel activism but simultaneously 
create high levels of circularity and return migration (Liang, Li and Ma 2013). Such institutional 
conditions effectively bolster sustained linkages between migrants and their places of origin and 
therefore strengthen the political impact of migrants. 
	
1 We use the term “collective resistance” to refer to the form of collective action most common in China. 
Collective resistance is not analogous to social movements, which entail aggregates of collective actions 
that are more sustained, larger in scale, and have broader policy or social goals. In China, incidental rather 
than structural grievances trigger collective resistance, which is locally oriented, centers on modest and 
narrow (typically economic) claims, and is rarely sustained. 
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We use longitudinal village-level data and in-depth interviews to assess how outward 
migration shapes both the occurrence and nature (forms and scales) of collective action in origin 
communities, and how the effect of migration is conditioned by preexisting social institutions. 
The village-level time series data are uniquely suited to studying aggregate-level processes such 
as collective action and general patterns of the impact of migration. We further use qualitative 
data from in-depth interviews to interrogate the mechanisms behind the quantitative results. 
 
EMPOWERMENT THROUGH RELATIONAL DIFFUSION 
Our conceptual framework, displayed in Figure 1, delineates the ways in which migration shapes 
both cognitive and social mechanisms of collective action. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
Outward migration can produce a process of relational diffusion that builds the cognitive 
foundation of collective action (path a). The social movement literature has long been interested 
in how elements of collective action spread, and has highlighted the importance of both social 
and structural conditions underlying the diffusion process (Oliver and Myers 2003; Givan, 
Roberts, and Soule 2010; Tarrow 2010). A common form of diffusion is relational diffusion, 
whereby movement repertoires are transmitted through strong social ties and established lines of 
interaction. Relational diffusion, however, often confronts a tradeoff between the fundamental 
social and structural conditions for diffusion, which can have a countervailing effect on the 
diffusion of new information.  
On the one hand, because individuals with strong ties have more frequent and richer 
interactions, relational diffusion produces great communication bandwidth (i.e., total volume of 
information transmitted) than non-relational forms of diffusion (Aral and Alstyne 2011). Also, 
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relational diffusion carries greater social influence in orienting people toward new attitudes and 
behaviors because of high mutual trust and shared identities embedded in strong social 
relationships (Strang and Soule 1998; Tarrow and McAdam 2005). On the other hand, relational 
diffusion can be limiting in the range of novel, non-redundant information that is spread (Siegel 
2009). Actors embedded in strong ties tend to be homogeneous and geographically proximate, 
and are therefore less likely than those with socially-distant ties to form structurally-diverse 
networks that are particularly suited for delivering novel information. Therefore, the social 
conditions fostering high communication bandwidth and social influence are often 
counterbalanced by structural deficiencies that constrain the "bridging" social capital needed to 
reach disparate sociopolitical environments and to generate diverse resources. 
Migration provides an undertheorized mechanism for collective action diffusion that can 
overcome the bandwidth-diversity tradeoff in ways that simultaneously achieve both favorable 
social and structural conditions for relational diffusion. Migrants (senders) are embedded in 
strong relational ties with people in origin communities (recipients), which strengthen their 
communication bandwidth and social influence. Migrants also occupy a unique bridging position 
as they transcend social-geographic boundaries and spread non-redundant information beyond 
locally-circumscribed social networks. The structurally-diverse networks that migrants create can 
provide access to new information and ideas for origin communities. As such, migration 
produces bridging ties with a strong relational base, capable of channeling novel resources in 
high bandwidth while effectively shaping attitudes and behaviors. The role of migration can be 
especially powerful in scenarios where collective action is costly and risky, as is the case in 
China. In these high-risk settings, unfiltered transmission of sensitive information requires high 
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social trust. Adoption of contentious behaviors requires social affirmation and reinforcement. 
Both rest heavily on strong social ties (Völker and Flap 2001; Centola and Macy 2007). 
The relational diffusion process driven by migration is premised on strong, continuous 
linkages that migrants preserve with their origin communities (Glick Schiller, Basch, and 
Szanton 1992; Faist 2000; Itzigsohn and Saucedo 2002; Vertovec 2004; Levitt and Jaworsky 
2007). Some argue that the linkages can be undermined by migrant integration, which shifts 
allegiance from the sending country to the host state (Waldinger 2015). However, a recent 
empirical study finds evidence for high durability in cross-border ties between migrants and 
origins (Verdery et al. 2018). These ties tend to be particularly strong among temporary migrants 
who intend to return or have little opportunity of settlement (Portes 1999). This characterizes the 
conditions in China. The massive flow of rural-to-urban migration, estimated at over 168 million 
people (National Bureau of Statistics of China 2015), is constrained by distinct state institutions, 
specifically the hukou (registration) system, which denies permanent settlement for many 
migrants (Solinger 1999). Such structural exclusion has produced distinct migration dynamics, 
marked by families that are split between origins and destinations (Fan, Sun, and Zheng 2011) 
and a high rate of circular migration and eventual return (Zhang 2015). These migration 
dynamics bolster the attachment of migrants to origin families as well as to their rural land 
(Murphy 2002), which serves as a critical safety net that allows migrants to retreat home in times 
of unemployment and retirement.2  
Migrants are uniquely positioned to act as bridge actors in the diffusion process. This 
stems from their contact with, and subsequent transformation by, different political environments 
	
2 Given the distinct institutional context surrounding internal migration, the degree of connection between 
internal migrants and origin communities in China is higher than internal and international migrants in a 
range of other settings (Liang, Li, and Ma 2013). 
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at their destinations. Migrants tend to adopt new political values and practices through 
socialization or political participation, even if they do so unconsciously (Fitzgerald 2000; Smith 
and Bakker 2008; Branton et al. 2015). Most research on migrants' political transformation 
focuses on international migrants in advanced democracies. However, migration to or within 
less-democratic or non-democratic societies can also produce a decoupling of locality and 
political sphere (FitzGerald 2006), similar to that theorized in the context of international 
migration. In these settings, a different mechanism of transformation may arise: lack of freedom 
and rights, rather than weakening democratic attitudes, raises or reinvigorates migrants' political 
awareness and provokes them to claim their rights (Kessler and Rother 2016).  
The experiences of rural-urban migrants in China are emblematic of these situations. 
Because of the structural exclusion, Chinese migrants confront substantial discrimination in the 
labor market and all too often fall victim to labor rights violations (Lee 2007; Lu and Wang 
2013), including low wages, overtime arrears, unlawful layoffs, and unpaid social insurance. In 
the meantime, they experience a more open political environment in cities that provide greater 
informational and political access than rural settings. Migrants are exposed to more reporting on 
labor laws and increased information about collective resistance staged by fellow migrant 
workers and urban residents (Qiu 2009). In the process, migrants become politicized, developing 
a keen perception of structural injustice and autonomous action, and increasingly mobilize 
among themselves to resist state discrimination (Lee 2007; Chan and Ngai 2009). 
As transformed migrants link previously unconnected milieus, they can spread 
politically-based cognitive resources to otherwise ill-informed villagers, thereby promoting 
democratic values and behaviors back home (Kapur 2010; Pérez-Armendáriz and Crow 2010; 
Batista and Vicente 2011; Pfutze 2012). A key question is whether that impact is realized 
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through a broad transmission of information and ideas or through a more instrumental process of 
political brokerage. In the former scenario, migrants may communicate with their kin about how 
political institutions function and how people engage in contentious politics in their destinations. 
They may also articulate opinions about political institutions and civic rights at home. This 
process shares a close affinity to the concept of "political remittances" in migration scholarship, 
which refers to the transfers of political information, ideas, and repertoires of contention from 
migrants to sending communities via long-distance communication or visits (Levitt 2001; 
Goldring 2004). The social movement literature suggests that real influence often involves more 
than the mere act of transmission, but rather, actions in which brokers consciously unpack and 
translate ideological and behavioral repertoires in ways that resonate with the concerns and 
specific situations of the recipients (McAdam and Rucht 1993; Tarrow and McAdam 2005; Della 
Porta, Kriesi, and Rucht 2009). In order to institute new ideas and practices in the origin 
population, migrants may consciously construct repertoires from previously disconnected 
localities or issue areas into meaningful substance and useful tools that allow people in the origin 
to adapt to their own struggles. The processes of political remittances and brokerage send 
cognitive cues that accumulate to engender “cognitive liberation,” a condition fundamental to the 
development of collective action (McAdam 1982; Nepstad 1997). These processes can spark 
spillover through reiteration and circulation within local social networks, reaching even 
individuals having no direct ties to migrants (Pérez-Armendariz and Crow 2010). The multiplier 
effect creates a community of cognitively empowered individuals who form a solid base for 
collective action.  
The cognitive empowerment induced by outward migration not only affects whether 
collective action occurs but what form it takes (e.g., contained and institutionalized vs. 
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contentious and non-institutionalized). This engages an important question in the movement 
literature—what conditions shape the radicalization of a movement? Is it a conscious strategy 
among actors who lack institutionalized political power (Gamson 1975)? Or is it an unintended 
consequence of structural breakdown in mobilization networks (Piven and Cloward 1979; 
Staggenborg 1988)? The process of relational diffusion leads us to expect the former in the 
context of migration. Movement actors rely heavily on known and available repertoires 
(McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001). Migration engenders new repertoires of contention in origin 
communities, prompting villagers who occupy subordinate positions to adopt more effective 
disruptive strategies. By disrupting public order using “unruly tactics” (Gamson 1975), or 
“weapons of the weak” (Scott 1985), challengers can create a form of “negative inducement” 
(Wilson 1961) to offset their structural powerlessness and increase their chance of redress.  
 The role of migration in the development and form of collective action is especially 
relevant for China. The resistance of both migrants and peasants has shifted from contained 
institutionalized strategies toward more contentious, non-institutionalized collective action. In 
the past, migrants usually resorted to orderly procedures by filing legal claims or petitions 
against exploitative employers or local officials (China Labour Bulletin 2009). In the process, 
they developed “informed disenchantment” (Michelson and Read 2011), as they discovered the 
inconsistency and corruption inherent in these formal routes (Cai 2010; Su and He 2010). These 
"insider" routes represent the “rule of man” rather than the “rule of law” (Minzner 2006), with 
decisions largely left to the discretion of state authorities and often leading to frustration. This 
frustration spurs the adoption of deinstitutionalized tactics, such as strikes and protests (Nang 
and Ngai 2009; Cai 2010; Elfstrom and Kuruvilla 2014). These "outsider" tactics prove more 
effective because of their ability to make grievances known, to disrupt public order, and to 
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directly challenge local officials’ desire for stability. This effectively offsets the institutional 
powerlessness of migrants. 
Peasant collective resistance has also grown steadily (O’Brien and Li 2006; Bernstein and 
Lü 2008). Since the early 2000s, peasant actions are organized overwhelmingly to oppose 
abusive land expropriation (Ho and Lin 2005; Yu 2007), in which local officials dispossess 
farmers of part or all of their land. This often occurs by force and without appropriate 
compensation. A detailed discussion of land expropriation is provided in Appendix B. Similar to 
migrants, peasants have gradually steered away from institutionalized channels of claims-
making, namely collective petition3, and have turned to noninstitutionalized action such as 
demonstrations, sit-ins, traffic stoppages, office blockades, construction obstruction, and clashes 
with officials or the police (O’Brien and Li 2006; Chen 2008; Cai 2010). These more contentious 
tactics supplement or replace petitions and often yield a better chance of redress.  
Peasant activism takes place amid a large information divide. Whereas ICT (information 
and communication technology) development in urban areas has created a more open public 
sphere and facilitated activism of migrants and urban residents (Harwit 2004; Qiu 2009; Yang 
2013), it lags far behind in rural China, where official media remains the key mechanism of 
political control (Sun and Chio 2012). This should limit peasants’ ability to obtain information 
on policies and rights, to develop political efficacy, and to stage effective resistance. 
Nonetheless, the reverse outcome has occurred, where peasants have increasingly engaged in 
non-institutionalized collective action. This highlights the importance of non-media channels, 
	
3 Collective petition is defined as more than five people lodging a formal complaint against local 
authorities (usually village or township officials) with higher-level authorities. According to the 
Regulations on Letters and Visits (State Council 2005), citizens filing petitions must elect no more than 
five delegates to represent themselves. A petition with more than five participants thus reflects an act of 
defiance against authoritarian rule and is regarded as collective resistance (Yu 2007). 
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such as relational channels induced by migration, for the rising collective resistance and 
changing forms of actions among peasants. 
 
DISINTEGRATION THROUGH COMMUNAL EROSION AND DEPOPULATION 
Migration also influences the social structure of origin communities in ways that shape collective 
action. The detrimental social consequences of migration have been documented, but have 
remain inadequately theorized and tested in relation to collective action. We contend that the 
social consequences of migration have the potential to undercut the structural basis for collective 
action (path b), even in cases where members of the origin communities become politically 
empowered. 
One immediate outcome of migration is depopulation, which depletes sending areas of 
able-bodied people who can be mobilized for collective action (De Haas 2010; Pedraza 2013). 
The problem becomes severe if migrants comprise disproportionately members of the 
community who would otherwise be especially likely to voice their discontent. This leads to 
“political brain drain” (Kapur 2010). In extreme situations, communities turn into “ghost towns” 
consisting primarily of the elderly and children (Kurtz 2004). 
When migration is used to flee local problems, it may provoke political disengagement 
within the origin population (Goodman and Hiskey 2008). The option of migration decreases the 
stakes that villagers attach to their home communities and estranges them from local political 
processes. In this respect, migration serves as a pressure valve that deflates mobilization from 
below by undercutting incentives in pressing for local political change. 
More important in the context of contemporary migration, out-migration tends to 
fragment initially dense social networks and erode the connective structure of local networks. 
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Both of these effects lead to communal erosion and impaired mobilizing capacity. The social 
movement literature has demonstrated a robust relationship between network density and 
connectivity on the one hand, and collective action on the other (McCarthy and Zald 1977; 
McCarthy 1996; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Diani and McAdam 2003; Tilly and Tarrow 
2007). Dense social networks, in which actors have many ties, serve as important mobilizing 
structures that foster solidarity and help amass resources for collective action. High network 
connectivity, in which actors can reach many others through direct or indirect ties, fosters 
cohesion and eases information diffusion as well as coordination of collective action. Migration 
inevitably weakens the density and connectivity of local networks by removing nodes (potential 
actors) and their associated edges (ties) (Entwisle et al. 2007). This is especially detrimental to 
mass mobilization when migrants occupy key nodes in the local networks. Their departure 
removes the nexus that previously connected community members. This undermines the 
connective structure of origin communities and diminishes social cohesion.  
The network-eroding process emanating from migration is likely not only to disrupt the 
social base of collective action but also to reduce the scale of action. The disintegrating effect is 
particularly strong for large-scale mobilization, which rests on a large number of participants and 
dense networks. The effect also tends to be amplified at a high level of migration. As a result, 
migration can exhibit a curvilinear relationship with collective action (Pfaff and Kim 2003). This 
means that migration can increase the likelihood of collective action in localities where it occurs 
on a small or moderate scale, but the positive effect decreases or even reverses when the level of 
exit becomes large. 
The detrimental social repercussions of migration are largely predicated on permanent 
out-migration that results in complete uprooting and limited connections. In China, migration is 
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characterized by high circularity and continuous attachment to the origin. Neither migrants nor 
peasants uproot or disengage entirely from their rural communities (Zhu 2007). In this context, 
the adverse disintegration effect may be attenuated and unlikely to completely suppress the 
mobilizing capacity of origin communities. 
 
THE ROLE OF PREEXISTING SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
The empowering and disintegrating effect of outward migration, hence the net impact of 
migration, is likely to be conditioned by established social institutions in origin communities. 
Not all communities experience the process of empowerment and disintegration uniformly. It is 
the confluence of migration and local social institutions that shapes the development of 
collective action. 
In rural China, the most important social institution is the lineage network (Cohen 2005; 
Liu and Murphy 2006). Villages are embedded in strong lineage networks when a large 
proportion of villagers descend from the same (or a few of the same) patrilineal ancestors and 
share the same surnames. The lineage system came under severe attack during the Mao era, but 
has experienced a remarkable revival since the beginning of economic reforms (Xiao 2001). 
These indigenous kinship-based institutions are a key source of collective identity, responsibility, 
and solidarity in rural China, and are reinforced through traditional rituals of ancestor worship 
and other social activities. They function as informal solidarity institutions, substituting for or 
complementing weak formal institutions in the countryside (Tsai 2007; Peng 2010; Lu and Tao 
2017).  
In the context of collective action, these institutions provide a durable relational and 
normative base that can be harnessed for collective action (path c; Lu and Tao 2017). 
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Specifically, strong lineage ties produce a connective structure to foster communal cohesion and 
dissemination of information. These ties further forge shared identities and moral obligation in 
ways that facilitate cooperation and help to overcome collective action problems of free-riding 
and defection. The power of these agnatic ties derives partly from their ability to enforce 
informal but efficacious social control through stable social interactions and social sanctions (He 
2003). These networks provide especially important mobilizing structures in repressive settings 
because they consist of actors in “abeyance” (Boekkooi and Klandermans 2013). That is, they 
may lie dormant in routine situations but bear a reserve of relational and normative resources that 
can be reactivated in times of need. In such times, lineage ties produce favorable social structures 
that translate cognitive liberation into collective action. 
Particularly relevant in the context of migration, established kinship-based social 
institutions help sustain migrants’ connections with home communities, thereby fostering the 
migration-driven diffusion process (path d). Specifically, lineage institutions include a strong 
discourse of membership, providing migrants with the means for activating solidarity and for 
remaining an active part of the family and community they leave behind. Migrants from villages 
embedded in dense local networks, such as strong lineage networks in our study setting, are more 
likely to maintain tight bonds with people who stay behind (Entwisle et al. 2007; Xiao 2001). 
This is especially true for cross-generational bonds, because strong lineage ties heighten a sense 
of filial piety and obligations to the family (Peng 2010). Migrants from these villages are also 
more likely to return for communal events (Xiao 2001). The robust bonds between migrants and 
home communities can generate high political remittances and brokerage, which further filter 
throughout the community along dense, highly connective local networks. In this context, even a 
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moderate number of bridge actors (i.e., politicized migrants) can trigger a chain reaction of 
diffusion and adoption, leading to community-wide shifts in collective behavior. 
 Established social institutions can also shield against structural disintegration (path e), 
thereby mitigating the disruptive social effects of migration on collective action. Villages 
embedded in strong lineage networks are characterized by high village network density and 
connectivity, thus have a strong degree of cohesion (Entwisle et al. 2007). They are emblematic 
of “networks with structural cohesion” (Moody and White 2003). In such networks, removal of 
members (nodes) through migration is unlikely to erode the network's connectivity structure. 
People left behind remain connected and can still reach many others through direct ties or 
indirect paths. Consequently, the relational and connective structure for mobilization, as well as 
communal cohesion, are preserved even if somewhat weakened. By contrast, villages with weak 
lineage networks become less cohesive and more likely to fragment, or even collapse, in the face 
of migration. 
 
MIGRATION AND COLLECTIVE RESISTANCE IN RURAL CHINA: WORKING 
HYPOTHESES 
The overall effect of migration on collective resistance depends on the balance of the opposing 
mechanisms of empowerment and disintegration; this in turn is shaped by the specific context of 
migration and preexisting local social institutions. China’s institutional context results in 
migration dynamics that reinforce strong linkages between migrants and origin communities 
while protecting against severe communal erosion. This institutional context also places migrants 
in a unique bridging position to spur relational diffusion. We thus expect the mechanism of 
cognitive empowerment to be more dominant than that of structural disintegration, leading to an 
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overall positive relationship between outward migration and collective resistance in rural China. 
In other words, the likelihood of collective resistance is greater in villages that experience a 
higher level of out-migration than in similar villages with a lower level of out-migration 
(Hypothesis 1). This does not imply that all migrants transmit political remittances or engage in 
political brokerage. But the higher the proportion of migrants from a village, the more likely 
these processes will transpire. 
 Migration is also likely to shape the nature of collective resistance in rural China. 
Distinguishing between form and scale of collective action allows us to isolate the mechanisms 
at play. On the one hand, the cognitive channel tends to operate differently for different forms of 
action (e.g., collective petitions vs. protests). Migrants serve as a source of cognitive 
empowerment through brokerage of repertoires of contention. This leads us to expect converging 
forms of collective resistance between migrants and peasants, that is, a tactical escalation from 
institutionalized (i.e., petitions) to noninstitutionalized forms (i.e., protests) of collective 
resistance. This would be manifested in the increasing adoption of non-institutionalized tactics in 
rural China. Put differently, outward migration increases the likelihood of protests rather than 
petitions (Hypothesis 2a).  
 On the other hand, the process of disintegration is likely to affect the scale of collective 
resistance. Even if community disintegration does not completely undermine the relational basis 
for collective mobilization in rural China, it can impede the community’s capacity for staging 
large-scale action. Large-scale collective action requires a larger network size and a higher 
degree of cohesion than small and medium-scale action. Out-migration adversely affects both of 
these preconditions. Therefore, we hypothesize that migration will have a weaker effect on large-
scale collective resistance than on small- and medium-scale action (Hypothesis 2b). Another way 
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of assessing the consequence of community disintegration is to examine whether a curvilinear 
relationship exists. The positive relationship between outward migration and collective action 
may exist for a certain level of migration and taper off (or first taper off and then reverse), if the 
level of migration increases further. However, migration in China is characterized by a high level 
of circularity and attachment, which suggests that migrants may not completely detach from 
origin communities and may return when crises strike. Hence, high outward migration is unlikely 
to completely suppress political engagement and collective action. We expect a weak or no 
curvilinear relationship between out-migration and collective action (Hypothesis 2c). 
 The role of migration is likely to depend on local social institutions. Cognitive 
empowerment inspired by migration and indigenous institutions built on strong social relations 
contribute distinct yet complementary resources for collective action. Communities embedded in 
strong lineage networks can leverage their established social ties and connective structure to 
foster migration-driven diffusion and offset structural disintegration. Put differently, strong 
lineage networks accentuate the positive effect while suppressing the negative effect of 
migration. Hence, we expect that the effect of migration on collective resistance is stronger in 
villages embedded in strong lineage networks than in villages with weak lineage networks 
(Hypothesis 3a). Strong lineage networks are especially critical in mitigating the negative effect 
on large-scale resistance (Hypothesis 3b). In contrast, less cohesive villages are more severely 
impaired by community disintegration, which limits the positive political effect of migration, 
even if their members do become politicized.  
 
DATA AND METHODS 
Data 
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We first use longitudinal survey data to examine the relationship between migration and 
collective resistance. The data are from the Rural Survey of Land, Migration, and Local 
Governance in China, carried out by the Center for Chinese Agricultural Policy at the China 
Academy of Sciences. The survey consisted of two rounds. The first round was conducted in 
2004-2005 using a multistage stratified sampling procedure. First, the country was divided into 
six commonly recognized geographical regions (State Council Development Research Centre 
2002), and one province was randomly chosen from each region: Shaanxi (Northwest), Sichuan 
(Southwest), Hebei (North-Central), Jilin (Northeast), Jiangsu (East/Central Coast), and Fujian 
(Southeast). All counties in each province were then sorted into five strata (quintiles) according 
to per capita gross industrial output. One county was randomly selected from each stratum, 
yielding a total of 30 counties. Next, all townships in each selected county were sorted into two 
groups according to per capita net income—above and below the median. One township was 
randomly selected from each group (a total of 60 townships). Following the same procedure, two 
administrative villages were chosen from each township (a total of 120 villages). Serious 
flooding prevented data collection in 4 villages, resulting in a total of 116 villages. The second 
round was conducted in 2008 and sought to re-interview all sample villages. Three villages were 
not re-interviewed due to massive disruptions caused by the 2008 Sichuan earthquake. Therefore, 
113 villages were interviewed in both periods and included in the analysis. 
Village-level data were gathered in both waves. Village-level information on 
demographic and socioeconomic characteristics came from village officials (party secretaries, 
village heads, and accountants). Such information was available from 2004 to 2008. The 
information was verified with village official statistics to ensure accuracy.  
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Household data were also gathered. Specifically, a random sample of 20 households 
based on village registration lists was chosen in each village. In each household, one adult was 
randomly selected for interview. More important, the household-level data were used to derive 
information on village collective resistance from 2004 to 2008. Because of the sensitivity of the 
subject, responses from local officials are unreliable. The survey did not ask about a respondent’s 
own participation to avoid putting them at risk. Instead, each respondent was asked to report 
collective incidents that had occurred in the village, regardless of their own participation. Each 
did so by answering a series of structured questions about timing, reasons, form (collective 
petition or a non-institutionalized form of collective action), scale, and outcome of petition. 
Trained project personnel, who were graduate students and faculty from local universities and 
who spoke local dialects, synthesized responses in each village to obtain an annual time series of 
collective incidents. This was done by corroborating respondents' reports about timing, reasons, 
and form of the action. In most cases, an event was reported by more than one respondent and 
the multiple reports matched, allowing us to identify and code a particular collective action 
incident. When there was ambiguous information or when respondents provided discordant 
information, respondents were re-contacted to verify details. Once event identification was 
completed, we integrated the event data with the village-level data.  
Our approach of surveying a random sample of respondents to collect information on 
local collective action has several distinct strengths. First, this approach generates more complete 
data than reports from newspapers.4 Second, this approach tends to generate more representative 
	
4 Newspapers have been an important source of protest event data in many societies. However, newspaper 
data are constrained in China because of heavy censorship. They catch only a small subset of collective 
action events (Goebel and Steinhardt 2019). We compared our data on protests with newspaper data from 
the WiseNews database, which contains more than 600 Chinese language newspapers, magazines, and 
websites since 1998. We confirmed the low coverage rate of newspapers for rural collective action: about 
19% of the protests in our data could be found in the database. In comparison, our approach covers 
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data than reports from either newspapers or a small, selected number of informants. Villagers can 
recall recent collective incidents relatively well because collective action constitutes a rare, 
salient event in village life and tends to be well-known in the local area (Wang and Wang 2016). 
Even if some respondents do not know about all collective incidents (especially in large 
administrative villages), a random sample ensures that we cover and receive information from 
different parts of the village (so that at least one report is provided). Third, the survey-based 
approach improves on conventional “protest event analysis,” which selects on the dependent 
variable by including only collective action that has emerged (Koopmans and Rucht 2002). The 
survey-based approach incorporates situations both where collective action erupts and where it 
fails to emerge. This allows for a more systematic investigation of the circumstances underlying 
the collective action emergence or community quiescence.  
We supplement the survey analysis with in-depth interviews to illuminate the 
mechanisms underlying the migration effect. The interviews took place in 61 villages across 40 
townships from six sampled provinces. They were initially conducted during the 2005 and 2008 
surveys. Periodic revisits and follow-up interviews in selected villages occurred between 2009 
and 2017. The researchers who ran the survey led the interviews, with assistance from local 
informants and graduate students. The interviews were conducted with ordinary villagers and 
migrants who were on return visits. We also interviewed by telephone nine migrants who were 
absent from the villages at the time. The interviews consisted of semi-structured questions 
designed to elicit narratives of local conflicts and collective incidents, migrants’ experiences, and 
	
substantially more events, even when newspapers are silent. The events in our data were further verified 
during in-depth interviews in a subset of 61 villages, in which we were able to further corroborate survey 
reports and obtain additional details for each collective incident in these villages. We carried out a 
sensitivity analysis by restricting the statistical analysis to these 61 villages and obtained consistent 
results. For these reasons, we believe that our survey-based approach is a useful alternative that 
overcomes the limitation of newspaper-based data in authoritarian regimes such as China.   
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ties between migrants and origin families. One hundred and fifty-one interviews were completed 




We conducted village-level analysis of several dependent variables that indicate different forms 
and scales of collective resistance. The first set of dependent variables measures the occurrence 
of collective petitions. The first variable indicates whether any collective petition (with more 
than five complainants) occurred in a village in each year. The second variable measures the 
occurrence of collective petitions with more than 50 participants, which we categorized as large-
scale collective incidents at the village level, in accordance with the “Emergency Plan for 
Preventing and Dealing with Mass Incidents” administered by local governments (Yu 2007).  
The second set of dependent variables measures the occurrence of non-institutionalized 
collective resistance (including protests, demonstrations, sit-ins, road or government building 
blockades, obstruction of construction, or physical confrontations with police or officials, 
hereafter, “protests”). Again, we constructed two dichotomous variables, indicating the 
occurrence of any protests and of protests with more than 50 participants.  
Figure 2 presents the total number of collective petitions and protests (in parentheses) 
across sample villages from 2004 through 2008 in each of the six provinces. Despite some 
regional variation, collective incidents spread across all provinces. In rural China, collective 
petitions are in general more common than protests.  
[Figure 2 about here] 
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The main predictor is the village out-migration ratio, which was measured by the 
proportion of working-age population (age 16-60) who worked and lived outside the county in 
each year.5 We focused on cross-county migration, following the standard definition in China 
(National Bureau of Statistics of China 2015). This is because within-county (e.g., cross-village 
or cross-township) migration involves shorter distances and more limited change in the 
socioeconomic environment. Within-county migrants often commute daily, which is different 
from the typical out-migration situation where migrants spend most of their time in urban areas 
away from home. We also controlled for whether land expropriation occurred in a village in a 
given year, which is the major source of local grievances and often triggers disputes over related 
issues such as local governance and elections (Yu 2007). As a measure of past local conflict, we 
used a dichotomous variable to indicate whether any collective resistance occurred in the village 
in the previous year. 
We controlled for a series of factors that may be associated with local political 
environment. We measured education by the proportion of villagers with at least some high 
school education. Village per capita annual income reflects the level of resources that may shape 
need and willingness to participate in collective resistance. Per capita fiscal transfer from upper-
level government indicates the degree of village collective resource endowments and the degree 
of financial reliance on local government. The proportion of households with a telephone 
(landline or cell phone) is an indicator of local telecommunications development, which shapes 
the frequency and quality of long-distance interactions with migrants. For the village non-
	
5 This study focuses on internal migration in China, which is substantially higher than international 
migration from China. International migration is low except in one of the survey provinces in our sample 
(Fujian province). Our data do not provide information on international migration. The role of 
international migration for rural collective action deserves separate investigation. We think that the 
political impact of international migration may be more limited because of its low rate and more 
permanent nature (hence lower circularity and linkage with origin communities). 
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agricultural economic structure, we included the number of privately owned enterprises. 
Measures of village population composition include village population size and the proportion of 
working-age population (age 16-60); both excluded migrants. The latter serves as a proxy for 
village population age structure. To account for land scarcity, we controlled for per capita 
household farmland. We also controlled for political capital by measuring whether anyone from 
the village currently works in the upper-levels of government. 
Pre-existing village social institutions, specifically the strength of village lineage 
networks, were operationalized in two ways in the analysis. We first constructed a variable of 
lineage structure. Following earlier research, we distinguished between villages embedded in 
strong lineage networks dominated by one or a few large lineages and villages where multiple 
descent groups exist (Kennedy 2002; Murphy, Tao, and Lu 2011). Villages with one or a few 
lineages are often referred to as having monopolistic or oligopolistic structures. These villages 
are characterized by a single or a few dense clusters of strong social ties. Villages with multiple 
descent groups, none with sufficient strength to dominate village life, are often referred to as 
mixed surname villages. The lineage structure variable was constructed using cluster analysis 
with information on the diversity of large surname clans (daxing) in the village—namely the 
percentage of households belonging to the largest patrilineal clan and the percentage of 
households belonging to the three largest patrilineal clans (more details in Appendix C). The 
procedure accounts for the absolute size of the largest lineage as well as its position relative to 
other descent groups. This is a measure of the structural features of lineage networks (i.e., 
density), which even if their power seems latent, can be reactivated for collective resistance 
when needs arise. The existence of dense lineage networks often, but not always, reflects the 
depth of social relations and cohesion. Hence, we also created a dichotomous variable that more 
	 25 
directly captures lineage solidarity and organizational strength. This is a measure of the 
regularity of organized lineage collective activities: that is, whether the village holds ancestral 
worship ceremonies at least annually (coded as 1, and 0 otherwise). Ancestral worship represents 
one of the most common collective lineage practices. Regular clan rituals represent a primary 
manifestation of the continuous presence of lineage in local life and solidarity among lineage 
members.  
Descriptive statistics of village-level variables in the first and last year of the analysis 
appear in Table 1 and are discussed in Appendix D. They are generally consistent with patterns 
demonstrated in previous research. 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Methods 
The unit of analysis is the administrative village. We pooled village-level data from 2004 
through 2008. This longitudinal design allows us to reduce potential biases and obtain more 
reliable results. A main source of bias occurs when village contextual factors (e.g., poor 
economic development or local governance, or other local socioeconomic and political factors) 
caused both out-migration and collective resistance. Without accounting for these conditions, 
which often are not adequately measured by the data, estimates of village migration tend to be 
unreliable (e.g., inflated if unobserved factors are positively associated with both out-migration 
and collective resistance). We used longitudinal fixed-effects models to adjust for potential 
confounding factors along socioeconomic and political dimensions at the village level, so long as 
they were time-invariant. This procedure effectively adjusts for village factors that remain stable 
during the five-year study period, including the village’s geographic location (and the higher 
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administrative level that incorporates the village), its geographical proximity to township seats or 
local economic center, its history of migration, and its political structure. There also could be 
time-varying factors that are associated with both out-migration and resistance. We included a 
rich array of time-varying factors in the models insofar as they are observable. For example, to 
capture local political shocks, we included previous collective action and occurrence of land 
expropriation in the village. We included year fixed effects to account for time-varying shocks 
across villages. 
The fixed-effects linear probability model is: 
P(Cit =1| x) =μt +αi + β×Migi(t-1) + Xi(t-1) Γ               (1) 
where Cit is the occurrence of collective petition or protest (of different scales) for village i in 
year t; μt is the year effects that absorb aggregate time-varying shocks which affect villages in a 
given year; Migi(t-1) indicates the village out-migration ratio for village i in year t-1; Xi(t-1) is a 
vector of one-year lagged control variables for village i in year t-1; and αi  represents the fixed 
effects specific to each village but constant over time, which effectively adjusts for time-
invariant observed and unobserved factors specific for each village. In all models, we lagged the 
independent variables by one year from the dependent variable to reduce possible bias from 
reverse causation. In essence, the time-lag strategy allows us to examine how out-migration 
(measured prior to the onset of collective action) affects subsequent collective resistance.6 This 
	
6 As an additional test, we examined whether local conditions including collective resistance could induce 
outward migration. The models were estimated via village-level fixed-effects regressions. Specifically, 
we used collective resistance or land expropriation in the previous year (together with one-year lag of the 
same set of control variables discussed above) to predict the rate of out-migration in the following year. 
Results in Appendix E show that decreased land resources were associated with a higher-level of 
migration from the community. But local political environment (as measured by the occurrence of 
collective petition or protest) was not systematically associated with out-migration. Hence, there is little 
evidence that migration occurs in response to political tensions at home. This is in line with previous 
research that the majority of peasants migrate for economic opportunities (Chan 2013).  
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strategy also takes account of the period required for new information and ideas from migrants to 
flow back. Using the lagged longitudinal design, the final sample size is 452 (village years).  
We could also use logit models with fixed-effects. But these models drop villages that 
experience no change in the occurrence of collective resistance over time (45% of villages in the 
data) and would result in a smaller sample and reduce the power and accuracy of our estimates. 
In this situation, a linear probability fixed-effects model is an effective approximation of the 
underlying probability for discrete-choice data and generally yields similar results (Wooldridge 
2010). It is also worth noting that, by design, time-invariant variables are not explicitly estimated 
in the fixed-effects models. This applies to the lineage variables, which do not change during the 
study period because they are the product of decades of evolution. A common identification 
strategy is to interact the time-invariant variables with time-varying variables (Allison 2009; 
Wooldridge 2010). Following this common practice, we included interactions between lineage 
structure and land expropriation (time-varying) to examine the role of lineage networks in 
collective resistance. 
To examine how local social institutions shape the role of migration, we included 
interactions between the village migration ratio and the measure of the strength of lineage 
networks, as in equation (2). 
P(Cit =1| x) =μt +αi + β1×Migi(t-1)+ β2×Migi(t-1) ×Li +  Xi(t-1) Γ               (2) 
where Li indicates village lineage networks (measured by network structure or collective 
activities), and Migi(t-1) ×Li is the interaction between migration and lineage networks. By 
examining the coefficients of migration and the interaction term, we are able to determine 
whether migration interacts with local social institutions to shape collective resistance. 
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RESULTS: MIGRATION AND COLLECTIVE RESISTANCE 
Regression results are presented in Table 2, which highlights the role of migration in shaping the 
occurrence and the nature of collective resistance. The village migration ratio was not 
significantly related to the probability of collective petitions (Model 1). It even seemed to 
decrease the emergence of large-scale petitions (Model 2). By contrast, the village migration 
ratio was positively associated with protests: protests were more likely to occur in villages with a 
higher level of out-migration than in otherwise similar villages with a lower rate of migration 
(Model 3). But the role of migration diminished and became nonsignificant for large-scale 
protests (Model 4). We conducted an additional analysis using logit fixed-effects regression 
(Model 5), which dropped villages with no over-time variation in the occurrence of protests. This 
analysis yielded a smaller sample size, but the result was substantively similar, pointing to a 
positive relationship between migration and protests. We thus used linear probability models for 
the main analyses because they retained a larger sample size. 
The results support Hypotheses 1 and 2 (2a and 2b). The observation that migration led to 
an increase in protests but not petitions is consistent with the radicalization of migrant activism 
in China. The convergence in the form of collective action provides suggestive evidence for 
migration-driven relational diffusion. Moreover, the politicizing effect of migration holds largely 
for small- and medium-size collective action, but not large-scale mobilization. This variation is 
consistent with the process we posited that the depleted human resources and communal erosion 
due to out-migration can undermine the social basis for large-scale mobilization.  
[Table 2 about here] 
Other important predictors of collective resistance include lineage networks. Villages 
embedded in strong lineage networks were more likely to experience collective petitions and 
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protests when facing land expropriation. Also important was the prevalence of telephones, 
presumably because they facilitated communication between migrants and home communities. 
Per capita farmland was negatively associated with the probability of large-scale protests, 
suggesting that more abundant land resources reduced the grievances triggered by land 
expropriation. Finally, there was an over-time increase in the probability of protests (except for 
the last year of survey) across sample villages. This was not the case for collective petitions.  
The in-depth interviews provide details about the transformation of migrants and the 
various mechanisms through which they shaped collective resistance back home. Many migrants 
acknowledged migration as a liberating and transformative experience, thanks to greater access 
to information in cities and to their interactions with fellow migrant workers and local residents. 
Interviewees noted several sources of enlightenment: being exposed to internet news about new 
labor policies or mass incidents; witnessing or participating in migrant labor strikes and protests 
(especially common in coastal cities with a large manufacturing sector); and observing protests 
organized by local residents to defend their property rights and collective rights to urbanized land 
(especially common in inland cities and migrants working in the service sector). 
Through socialization or first-hand experience, migrants received cognitive cues and 
developed a greater sense of political consciousness and efficacy, setting the stage for migration-
driven diffusion. This was manifested in a deeper understanding of the political system and 
repertoires of contention, particularly how collective action and direct action can make a 
difference by exerting pressure on the government. One recurring narrative was the power of 
collective action as opposed to individual action. A migrant from Hebei noted: “The more 
people, the greater the force (ren duo li liang da). The government ignores individual claims. We 
can resolve problems in the short term when we gather force.” Another recurring theme was the 
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effectiveness of direct action. This was especially common among migrants who were directly 
involved in labor struggles or closely witnessed their coworkers' struggles. These experiences 
prompted migrants to develop negative dispositions, or “informed disenchantment,” toward the 
state bureaucracy and formal channels of claims-making. A migrant from Jiangsu, who engaged 
in a yearlong struggle to claim back pay, discussed his revelation: “Petitions are useless. Before 
we petitioned, I thought government officials obeyed the law. They did not know about our 
problems. After the petition, I realized that all officials collude (chuantong). They ignore you 
(buli ni) and hold you back (tuozhe ni). It is like stones sinking into the ocean (shichen dahai). 
We cannot afford it (hao bu qi)… Going to the street is most direct. After we took to the street, 
people from the labor bureau came to us. They solved our problems.” 
 Our fieldwork illustrates the reactive nature of migration-driven diffusion. Diffusion was 
most often activated in response to local crises that infringed upon the immediate interests of 
peasants and migrants. Routine communications between migrants and remaining villagers 
largely focused on family matters. Talk about rights or migrant struggles in the city filtered only 
intermittently into these communications. However, the situation thoroughly changed when 
troubles struck at home. This was especially true when villagers fell victim to land 
expropriations, the primary trigger of grievances in rural China. In our data, more than 87% of 
collective action can be attributed to land-related issues. Such troubles not only put the 
immediate interests of peasants at stake but also threatened the long-term interest of migrants. 
Many migrants, even the younger generations, acknowledged land as a critical form of insurance 
should they fail to make ends meet in the city or intend to return at old age.  
Local infringements revolving around land issues compelled migrants to engage and 
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those who remained to actively seek help from migrants.7 A Fujian peasant recounted a land 
crisis in his village, where the expansion of a cement plant imperiled local farmland: “Although 
my son went out for work, he is always a member of the family. We surely informed him of the 
land issue the first thing (diyi shijian) and discussed (shangliang) it with him. It involves his 
interest as well. I cannot make all the decision myself. He also wished to settle this problem, to 
maximize our interest. If we lose our land, it is a life matter.” Another peasant in the village 
added: “At that time, there were mostly elderly people, women, and children in the village. They 
must call on young people and men. Migrants also called back to check on the situation… How 
can they [migrants] concentrate at work (anxin dagong) when their houses and land are being 
torn down?” Statistical analysis (Model 6) supports the reactive nature of the migration effect. 
The interaction term between the village migration ratio and the occurrence of land expropriation 
was positive and statistically significant. This suggests that migration is most likely to drive 
diffusion and mobilization in the face of local crisis. 
When land expropriation occurred, migrants activated a process of political diffusion. It 
took various forms, ranging from providing information on policies and diagnosis of local 
violations, to raising rights consciousness and action orientations, to advising on repertoires of 
contention. Because peasants often have limited knowledge about government policies and their 
legal rights, migrants helped fill the information gap. In one example, a Jiangsu village took part 
in a national highway project in which families had plots of farmland expropriated. The township 
	
7 To be sure, not all migrants share the kind of liberating experience and positive political impact back 
home. Some migrants were frustrated or even went through significant losses (e.g., fired, detained) in 
fighting for their labor rights in cities. There are reasons to believe that the role of politically unsuccessful 
migrants is limited as they become disempowered and less contentious. However, extreme circumstances 
such as land expropriations can activate even these migrants to reflect on and share their experiences and 
lessons learned. A migrant from Sichuan described how he was initially depoliticized by his urban 
experience but later re-politicized to help peasants defend their land rights: “Even a rabbit will bite if it is 
desperate (tuzi jile ye yaoren).” 
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government promised peasants standard compensations but delivered none. At first, villagers had 
little knowledge of their land rights, the compensation to which they were entitled, or means for 
redress. The believed that the local government had the rights to their land and they could hardly 
make any claims on the government. When migrants learned about this, they explained national 
policies to their families, helped peasants identify local abuses, and encouraged them to take 
action to defend their rights. Some migrants went a step further, checking local and national 
compensation standards and finding that the appropriate compensation should be at least 20,000 
RMB per mu. These efforts provided aggrieved peasants with cognitive cues that eventually 
spurred them into action. A villager recounted how his perceptions changed after a series of 
discussions with his migrant son: “Before, I thought we had few rights and we could not win 
over the government. There is no point in bothering with them. I talked to my son and I realize 
that actually we can do something about it. We have more rights than we thought. Defending our 
land rights is not illegal. We should stand up for ourselves.”  
 Migration-driven diffusion involves not only informational and ideational dimensions but 
also a broad repertoire of contention, particularly tactics effective with local governments. Our 
interviews are replete with cases where migrants emphasized the leverage peasants can gain 
through the use of collective action and non-institutionalized tactics. A migrant from the Jiangsu 
village advised his fellow villagers, who at the time were contemplating a formal complaint: 
“Don’t go as one person. You need to call a lot of people to make it work… Petitioning the 
government is a dead end, no matter which level of government you petition. You don’t even 
know who is the person in charge. Officials protect each other (guanguan xianghu). It is unlikely 
to be resolved in three months, or in a year, or longer. How long can you wait?... You have to 
cause some disturbance (nao). You can block the construction. Then the government pays more 
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attention to you. I have seen other people succeed this way.” The input of migrants prompted 
villagers to reevaluate the traditionally favored institutionalized strategy of claims-making and 
expand their tactical repertoires to include non-institutionalized strategies. In this example, the 
peasants were eventually empowered to act on their new consciousness and repertoires by taking 
their issues to the street. They flocked to the construction site, blocking the site and seizing the 
bulldozers for several days. This pressured local officials to deliver compensations totaling over 
500,000 RMB. 
 Whereas peasants in the Jiangsu village bypassed institutionalized channels, others 
sometimes used direct action to supplement petitions. Peasants who take their cues from official 
media see petitioning the government as the default strategy. As they humbly petition and 
patiently wait for a response, they have little knowledge of other means of redress and thus have 
the tendency to relinquish claims when petitions fail. In a Jilin village, local governments 
planned on expropriating over 400 mu of land for a commercial park development project. If 
completed, per capita farmland would have decreased to below 0.5 mu. Villagers filed a series of 
collective petitions to different levels of government but failed to elicit a response. As villagers 
discussed their frustrations with families and friends, many of whom worked in cities in the 
North, they became aware of alternative strategies that would tip the balance of power. One 
peasant recalled conversations with his migrant family members: “They told me not to quit. If 
the government keeps ignoring us, we should call up a lot of people and sit-in in front of the 
government building.” Another migrant from the village advised the villagers on ways to 
legitimize their sit-in, by portraying it as a natural growth of petitioning: “You are not breaking 
the law. You have something to say (youhua keshuo). Tell them you have followed the 
regulations. You petitioned first. But there was no response.” Feeling emboldened, a group of 
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peasants went to sit in and protest in front of the municipal government building. In the end, 
local governments paid partial compensations to peasants and agreed to appropriate half of the 
originally planned land. 
The foregoing examples illustrate the mechanisms by which migrants diffuse new 
information, consciousness, and repertoires of contention to those who stay behind. This 
cognitive process empowered peasants to engage in non-institutionalized collective resistance in 
defense of their rights. By using more radical tactics, peasants forced state officials to engage 
them outside the established channels within which the officials derive their power. In these 
processes, migrants acted not simply as carriers of political remittances but more often as 
concerted political brokers. They translated their experience and knowledge to peasants’ 
struggles; they also consciously shaped villagers’ understanding about the workings of the 
political system and ways to challenge their structural powerlessness. The brokerage process 
carries substantial social influence as it is built on strong social relations characterized by trust 
and shared interest. A peasant in Jiangsu commented on the influence of his son: “Of course I 
listen to him. My interest is his interest. He thinks in our best interest. He learns about these 
things from his personal experience. It is not like we read it from a newspaper.” 
 Our fieldwork also reveals detrimental social transformations that had taken place or 
loomed large in migrant-origin communities. One is depopulation. A Fujian villager noted: “We 
no longer have many people in the village. Sometimes we are even short-handed (que renshou) 
for weddings and funerals (hongbai xishi).” Another challenge is weakened local networks and 
solidarity. As an increasing number of people leave for work, connections between those who 
remain loosened. A villager from Shaanxi acknowledged the change: “People drift apart, not as 
close as before. It is more difficult to organize public events now.” These patterns can undercut 
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the community’s ability to organize large-scale action due to a lack of people and diminishing 
solidarity.  
Nevertheless, even if villages lose a notable share of members to migration, their capacity 
for collective action may not be entirely depleted. We find that many migrants maintained 
enduring attachment to their origin villages and land. This is true even for the small group of 
relatively well-off migrants, many of whom earn stable income or own property, but who are 
excluded from full urban citizenship and feel a strong sense of attachment to their rural land. 
This durable link compels many migrants, regardless of socioeconomic status, to guard their land 
rights with unusual ferocity. Crises that directly threaten migrants' interests, for example land 
expropriation, can even prompt some migrants to return home and participate in collective 
resistance. This was particularly true if migrants were close by. But even long distances do not 
preclude migrants from contributing to rural collective resistance. In such cases, migrants 
engaged in long-distance communications and, when the circumstances were especially dire, 
often returned to join the action. In the Jiangsu village discussed above, dozens of migrants 
returned to join peasants in protest, some from as far as Guangdong. Consistent with these 
processes, we find little evidence for a curvilinear relationship between migration and collective 
resistance (Hypothesis 2c). As shown in Model 7, the quadratic term was not significant. In other 
words, collective action can occur even when a village experiences a high level of out-migration. 
This is because migrants can buttress collective action through political brokerage that mobilizes 
collective resistance in the home village; migrants may also return to participate in such actions.  
 
RESULTS: MIGRATION, LINEAGES, AND COLLECTIVE RESISTANCE 
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We also find substantial variations across villages embedded in distinct social institutions. As 
displayed in Table 3, the effect of migration unfolds in distinct ways depending on local lineage 
networks. Although the main effect of the village migration ratio was small and insignificant, the 
interaction term between migration and lineage networks was positive and significant. The 
pattern holds for both measures of lineage networks (Model 1 and 2). This suggests that the 
positive role of migration for protests was more pronounced in villages embedded in strong 
lineage networks (Hypothesis 3a). By contrast, in villages lacking a strong social base, 
community disintegration loomed large, thereby limiting the positive effect of migration. The 
difference is clearly illustrated in Figure 3, which shows the marginal effect of migration on the 
probability of protests for villages embedded in strong and weak lineage networks. The solid line 
indicates the effect of migration and the dotted lines represent the 95% confidence intervals 
(CIs). A statistically significant positive effect appears when the upper and lower bounds of the 
CIs are both above zero. We see that in villages embedded in strong lineage networks, migration 
had a positive effect on protests, except at very low levels of out-migration (village migration 
ratio < 0.1). In villages with weak lineage ties, however, migration was not significantly 
associated with protests across all levels of migration. Moreover, Model 3 shows that in close-
knit villages, the role of migration turns positive even for large-scale protests (Hypothesis 3b). 
This result further underscores the importance of pre-existing social institutions in facilitating 
collective mobilization. 
[Table 3 and Figure 3 about here] 
 Additional quantitative analysis and in-depth interviews illuminate the ways that lineage 
networks accentuate the positive effect while suppressing the negative impact of migration. First, 
connections between migrants and their home villages were stronger in villages embedded in 
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strong lineage networks, as these networks facilitate frequent contact and subsequent migration-
driven diffusion.8 The household survey included several questions indicating the link between 
migrants and origin families. One question asked: “On average, how often does the migrant call 
(to the respondent’s phone, neighbor’s phone, or a public phone)?" Another question asked: “Did 
the migrant pay return visits in the past year during major holidays (Spring Festival, Tomb 
Sweeping Festival, Mid-Autumn Festival, and National Day), family weddings and funerals, and 
the harvest season?" Results show that 69% of migrants in close-knit villages phoned home at 
least once every month, compared to 48% of migrants in less cohesive villages. About 66% of 
migrants in close-knit villages paid one or more return visits in the previous year, which was true 
for 51% of migrants in less cohesive villages. Differences in both long-distance communication 
and return visits are statistically significant. Maintaining frequent communications and making 
regular visits evince the strength of migrant-origin connections and reaffirm migrants' belonging 
to their family and kinship clans. The pattern was also illustrated in interviews. As a Jiangsu 
villager commented: “People go out to work. We don’t see each other very much. But they come 
back for Qingming, for Spring festival. When they are back, things are just like before. People 
are still affectionate (qinre) with each other.” In fact, these holidays are important occasions for 
hosting traditional lineage rituals such as ancestral worship.  
Second, strong lineage networks preserve community solidarity and shield against 
communal erosion. Whereas peasants in close-knit villages felt somewhat loosened communal 
	
8 We also examined the relationship between village lineage networks and out-migration. Specifically, we 
tested whether the rate of out-migration in villages embedded in strong lineage networks was lower than 
that in less cohesive villages. The results show no significant relationship. This is consistent with previous 
research documenting that internal migration in China is primarily economically driven and that many 
villagers fulfil family obligations through migration and monetary remittances (Chan 2013). That said, it 
is probable that individuals from villages with strong lineage networks exhibit different patterns of 
migration (e.g., shorter distance). This is an interesting question that deserves future research.	
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ties after migration, they also acknowledged the preservation of a baseline level of cohesion, 
which helped overcome some of the negative disintegrating effect of migration. In the words of 
one Fujian villager:  
 
Young people leave. There are fewer people in the village. But those of us who are left 
here still consider each other relatives. We have been on good terms (jiaoqing hao) before 
people moved out. And we remain close now. Migration does not change our relationship. 
We often visit one another (zoudong). For weddings and funerals, we don’t have to call on 
people (buyong han). People will come together. When we are short-handed for weddings 
and funerals, we call back migrants … If anything happens in the village that involves 
people’s common interest, it is easy to mobilize. People identify with each other. 
 
We also find that, even in places where lineage ties seemed to lie dormant on a routine 
basis, these ties could be reactivated in times of need. One Hebei villager illustrated the point: 
“Now there is a weaker sense of collective. But if something big and terrible happens (chu 
dashi), clan elders would speak out. People can still be rallied around the issue. There were 
worries that people’s hearts no longer go together (renxin sanle). So last year the clan elders 
organized entertainment and sports games to raise money from society. Most villagers 
participated. The event raised more than 9,000 RMB.” 
A shared identity and strong solidarity permeated close-knit communities even in the face 
of exodus, providing important mobilizing structures for collective resistance. The Jiangsu 
village, which was dominated by a single clan, offers a telling example of how migration 
combines with lineage networks to facilitate collective action. As discussed above, migrants 
	 39 
from the village brokered new consciousness and repertoires of contention back home. In the 
process, several activists surfaced, including two migrant workers and several villagers who were 
empowered by migrant family members. Together they sought out local elites (i.e., clan elders), 
sharing information and urging them to take action. This strategy turned out to be critical in 
disseminating information to the wider community and mobilizing a broad mass base. One 
activist remarked: “We pushed them [clan elders] to the front (tuidao qianmian). After all they 
are well-regarded. We told them—you should go talk to people. Tell them what we told you. 
People really listen to you.” Feeling obligated, two clan elders came forward and helped 
mobilize villagers into action. They spoke out during a village opera (changxi) and called on 
villagers to join later meetings. Families sent representatives to the subsequent meetings, in 
which the elders and activists discussed land rights and strategies and reiterated a message: “The 
policy said the land is ours. Whoever uses our land should compensate us. They cannot use the 
land before the money is in place (qian budaowei).” The message was diffused along the dense 
local networks, even as villagers gathered to chat or play cards and mahjong together. In this 
way, repertoires of contention initially brokered by migrants reached a wider audience.  
The dense local networks also cultivated collective responsibility and cooperation. 
Families took turns protesting and occupying the construction site during the blockade, 
alternating between day and night shifts. This ensured that no construction could possibly take 
place on their land. A group of migrants also returned to join the villagers. As one villager 
recounted: “As long as somebody takes the lead (daitou), the rest will respond (xiangying). After 
a little mobilization (diaodong yixia), people all went to the street. How could someone stay 
home and do nothing when the rest of the village take action?” On the fifth day of protest, a 
police force arrived at the village. The entire village was informed of the police presence and 
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was called upon to show up at the construction site. House to house, the villagers shouted, “Let’s 
all go there to express our will and to support (zhiyuan) each other.” More than 120 people 
showed up within hours, cramming the construction site and nearby areas. The scale and 
solidarity manifested in the protests contributed to its peaceful resolution. In this example, dense 
local networks provided the mobilizing structure and a high degree of coordination for large-
scale collective action, even in this high-migration village. 
In contrast, the case of a Sichuan village lends insights into how out-migration can 
disrupt mobilizing capacity and counteract migrant-driven diffusion in less cohesive villages. A 
villager noted a dearth of communal activities: “After people go out, the rest just mind their own 
business. We rarely visit each other’s house (chuanmen) anymore. People have drifted apart 
(shuyuan).” Diminished interactions and communal unity turned costly when local authorities 
robbed villagers of their land without proper compensation. Anguish and helplessness permeated 
the village. Instead of rising in protest, the village was paralyzed. One migrant worker from the 
village who spoke to us expressed great frustration over his fruitless effort. The migrant had 
repeatedly discussed the issue with his family and neighbors and urged them to take action. He 
lamented: “I talked to them about rights, about doing something. But nothing happened. By now 
many people know it is illegal. But just knowing is not enough. People live their own lives 
(geguo gede). It is difficult to rally people together. People talked about it. No one takes action. 
No one takes the lead.” At the time of the fieldwork, a quarter of the land had been taken while 
the villagers received no compensation. No protest has erupted. 
 
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
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The present study examines the relationship between migration and collective action in migrant-
sending communities. We consider multiple facilitating and inhibiting mechanisms emanating 
from outward migration. We also identify social conditions that promote or attenuate the 
politicizing effect of migration. Using longitudinal data and in-depth interviews from rural 
China, we find that outward migration affects both the cognitive and social foundation of 
collective action in origin communities, which subsequently shapes the development and the 
nature of collective action. In rural China, migration in general spurs collective action, especially 
non-institutionalized action similar to that adopted by migrants. The convergence of tactics 
between migrants and peasants occurs because of migration-driven relational diffusion through 
political remittances and brokerage. The process of brokerage is especially salient, as migrants 
introduce new repertoires of contention, which through interpretive exchanges both inform and 
embolden peasants. Nevertheless, the same process of outward migration precipitates adverse 
social transformations that can lead to community disintegration. These transformations weaken 
the potential of origin communities for large-scale mobilization, even though they do not entirely 
deplete the foundation for smaller-scale collective action. In the end, the role of migration 
depends on local social institutions: it is stronger in close-knit villages embedded in dense 
lineage networks and weaker in less cohesive villages. The combination of cognitive resources 
induced by migration and social reserves built on preexisting social institutions provides the 
most favorable conditions for collective action. 
Our study makes several contributions to the literature. First, it connects previously 
separate literature on migration and social movements to show the micro- and meso-level 
dynamics of collective action development in changing demographic landscapes. Both the 
theories of collective action and of migration can benefit from analysis of the relationship 
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between the two. On the one hand, our findings highlight the value of considering the influence 
of demographic forces, such as migration, in studying the processes of diffusion, empowerment, 
and mobilization in collective action. The migration process sheds light on a new, effective 
mechanism of relational diffusion, whereby migrants act as bridge actors rooted in strong, 
enduring social ties. This form of relational diffusion contrasts with other scenarios of diffusion 
that often confront a tradeoff between diversity and bandwidth (Aral and Alstyne 2011). 
Migration-driven relational diffusion assumes substantial social influence, particularly in high-
risk nondemocratic settings where trust and shared identity is key. In this respect, “exit" and 
"voice" can be complementary in bringing about political change. It is also worth noting that the 
effect is largely reactive: relational diffusion induced by migrants is commonly activated in 
response to local crises, such as when peasants’ and migrants’ rights (e.g., land rights) are 
challenged. This finding underscores the importance of threats as inducements to contention 
(Almeida 2003; Goldstone and Tilly 2001; Snow et al. 1998). Threats operate in concert with 
political opportunities generated by migration networks to promote the development of collective 
action.  
On the other hand, the findings add to the migration literature by extending the analysis 
of the "migration-development nexus" (Curran 2016) to the political realm. Migrants are capable 
of bringing not only economic and social transformation but also political change back home. 
Furthermore, the study adds to our understanding of the relationship between human behavior 
and social structure (Entwisle 2007; Entwisle et al. 2007). Human behavior such as migration 
can shape the relational and connective structure of locally-based social networks. This has 
important ramifications for communal cohesion and community-level outcomes such as 
collective action. Ideally, one would directly measure complete village networks for a large 
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number of villages. But such data are seldom available in surveys, with a few notable exceptions 
(e.g., Entwisle et al. 2007). We thus rely on qualitative interviews to illustrate changing village 
network structure and cohesion in the context of out-migration. A more systematic investigation 
of the relationship between migration and social structure requires better data. 
Second, the present study engages the question of why certain forms and scales of action 
emerge. This investigation allows us to uncover multiplex, nuanced impacts of migration. 
Indeed, the cognitive and social processes underlying migration shape not only whether 
collective resistance occurs but also its form and scale. Migration spurs non-institutionalized 
collective action but not institutionalized action. The results shed light on the question of 
whether movement radicalization represents a conscious choice or is the unintended result of 
organizational breakdown. In the context of migration, peasants consciously escalate tactics. 
They are inspired by the repertoires of contention brokered by migrants; they also comprehend 
the effectiveness of de-institutionalized “outsider” tactics as a means of offsetting their structural 
powerlessness. Furthermore, the scale of collective resistance is closely associated with the level 
of outward migration. A large exodus of migrants can lead to communal erosion in origin 
villages, undercutting the capacity for large-scale mobilization. Hence, the positive effect of 
migration holds largely for small- and medium-scale collective action.  
Third, the role of migration is conditioned by local social-institutional context. 
Indigenous social institutions in origin communities interact with the sociopolitical processes 
induced by migration. This adds to our understanding of the ways in which agency and structure 
interact to shape collective action. Preexisting social institutions built on strong lineage networks 
provide durable mobilizing structures. They reinforce migrants’ connections to home 
communities and foster high solidarity to overcome the disintegrating effect of exodus. Such a 
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social base makes even large-scale mobilizations possible in the context of out-migration. Local 
social institutions provide complementary resources to the cognitive liberation brokered by 
migrants, allowing some communities to maintain their connective structure while enjoying the 
fruits of migration.  
Finally, the present study emphasizes a contextualized approach, focusing on the role of 
broader institutional environments in structuring the politicizing effect of migration. The positive 
net effect of migration in rural China grows largely out of structural exclusion embodied in the 
hukou system and associated social policies that have created a high circular and return 
migration. The structural exclusion fosters migrants’ attachments to home communities and 
farmland, while also buffering original communities from severe, chronic disintegration. The 
same institutional factors provoke migrants’ activism in cities as they protest structural 
discrimination. The confluence of these forces places Chinese migrants in a unique position to 
transcend the enclosed rural political environment and serve as a conduit of political diffusion. In 
this respect, China’s distinct institutions produce converging effects that inadvertently strengthen 
the political significance of migrants for origin communities. This stands in contrast to many 
other settings of migration, where the same institutional forces often produce diverging 
consequences—bolstering migrants’ integration in destinations while dampening their 
connections to origins (Waldinger 2015).  
Our study brings internal migration and nondemocratic settings back into conversations 
about migration and social movements that have largely focused on international migration and 
democratic settings. Migration-driven diffusion is not restricted to transnational migration to 
more democratic societies. Although transnational migration typically entails greater 
socioeconomic and political differences than domestic migration, rural-to-urban migration in 
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developing countries often faces a similar kind of transition and challenge (albeit possibly to a 
lesser degree) (Fitzgerald 2006). In China, rural-to-urban migration spans distinct political 
spheres and constitutes a transformative experience for migrants and their families. What 
differentiates migrants’ experiences is less about the dichotomy between internal and 
international migration than the structural distinctions based on migrants’ “membership and 
belonging” − that is, the barriers to integration and distance traveled (economic, sociocultural, 
and political) (Brown and Bean 2016). China, with its controlled migration system and political 
environment, also reveals a less discussed mechanism underlying the political importance of 
migrants—empowerment in an exclusionary context. Previous research focuses on the role of 
inclusionary reception contexts in enhancing migrants’ exposure to democratic institutions 
(Koopmans and Statham 1999; Giugni and Passy 2004). These studies focus on the way such 
positive political experience may subsequently be channeled back home. We argue that the 
liberating experience of migration is not confined to these settings. An exclusionary context 
characterized by discrimination and limited protection can also spur migrants’ political activism, 
as they strive to maintain their status quo (Okamoto and Ebert 2010; Kessler and Rother 2016). 
This negative experience, which is not unique to Chinese migrants and is also observed for 
undocumented and minority immigrants across diverse settings, can also heighten migrants’ 
commitment to political participation.  
This study provides a useful new lens for understanding contentious politics in China. It 
underscores the linkage between urban and rural resistance, which have traditionally been 
portrayed as unrelated phenomena. We argue that migration inherently opens political spaces for 
migrants and peasants, bringing together typically segmented lines of contention in rural and 
urban areas. In doing so, migrants have emerged as critical allies of peasants, helping the latter to 
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overcome their structural powerlessness. In this respect, the long-standing separationist state 
institutions (i.e., the hukou system and associated policies) that have marginalized peasants and 
maintained socio-political stability by forestalling links between rural and urban sectors (Wang 
2005) have inadvertently politicized and emancipated many migrants and peasants. This shift has 
begun to impinge on the central government, as it gradually loses levers of political domination. 
Because our study focuses on the agency of migrants and peasants in origin communities, we 
have not examined local state responses to this phenomenon. Whether state authorities have fully 
grasped the political potential of migrants and how they grapple with maintaining control over an 
increasingly open rural society is an important question that merits in-depth investigation. 
 It is premature to tell if migrants will emerge as a formidable source of fundamental 
political change in rural China. For one, migration is not a sufficient condition for collective 
action. Its influence is heavily conditioned by local social institutions. Neither is migration the 
only conduit of information flows to the village. Rather, we contend that migration serves as an 
important channel of diffusion, independent of and in addition to other media-based channels of 
information access, which are often undermined by authoritarian control. For another, rural 
resistance is too complicated to be explained solely by migration. A limiting factor is the cellular 
nature of migrants’ and peasants’ activism, which is locally oriented, short-lived, and centered on 
narrow economic claims and remedial measures. These actions rarely escalate into class 
movements or trans-local struggles, and they are seldom directed at instituting broader changes 
for improving the collective rights of migrants or peasants. The cellularization is partly inherent 
considering the importance of cohesive networks for movement diffusion in high-risk 
authoritarian settings (Flap and Volker 2003). It is further reinforced by the common local social 
structure underlying collective action. Lineage networks, while providing an important social 
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foundation for collective action in the face of exodus, tend to be tightly clustered and lack 
bridging capacity outside the localized society to create wider diffusion (Siegel 2009). Hence, we 
have yet to see an upward “scale shift” (McAdam 2003; Tarrow and McAdam 2005), in which 
localized collective action reaches a geographically or institutionally distant group, with 
coordinated action between the two sites to forge a broader social movement around a common 
set of goals.  
Current changes in migration and public space in China are likely to govern the political 
effect of migration for origin communities. At the moment, first-generation migrants are retiring 
and returning home (Liang, Li, and Ma 2014). Furthermore, recent economic slowdowns lead to 
factory closures, generating a reverse migration flow among young and middle-age migrants 
(Kong et al. 2009). For those who return, land becomes a potential source of contention. This is 
illustrated by the fact that land disputes involving return migrants increased by 125% between 
2007 and 2008 (Shi 2009). These outcomes are reinforced by a general pattern of migration 
involving shorter distances, as migrants increasingly choose to move to cities and provinces 
closer to home (Liang et al. 2014). All this facilitates persistent connections between migrants 
and their origin communities. It is also worth noting that second-generation migrants have come 
of age. Compared to the first generation, who often view themselves as temporary workers, the 
second-generation expresses a stronger intention to take root in cities and thus have weaker 
attachment to their rural home. But these young migrants confront as many structural barriers as 
the older generation, which many recognize over time. This motivates them to maintain their 
village affiliation and land rights (Zhu 2007; Fan and Wang 2008). With all this in mind, the 
political significance of migration is likely to persist, insofar as migrant workers continue to be 
denied full urban citizenship (Chan 2013). The importance of migrants as an interpersonal 
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channel of diffusion may even grow in the face of contracting public space and tightening media 
control in China. In such a setting, migrants can serve as an informal source of political diffusion 
and influence that helps break through authoritarian censorship. 
To what extent are our findings generalizable outside China? Because the circumstances 
underlying migration in China are unique, we may not observe identical migration effects 
elsewhere. However, we are likely to find commonalities in settings with similar migration 
dynamics—where permanent settlement is elusive and ties to homeland remain strong. Even if 
the overall impact of migration does not generalize, the underlying mechanisms of migration 
(i.e., relational diffusion, community disintegration) are likely to unfold in similar ways, albeit to 
varying degrees. With increasing migration worldwide, especially that originating from 
authoritarian regimes and developing democracies, investigating the political impact of 
transnational and trans-local migration under distinct institutional contexts will be a fruitful 
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Figure 2. Total Number of Collective Petitions and Noninstitutionalized Collective Action (in parentheses) during 2004-2008 by 


































































Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
 
 2004/2005  2007/2008  
 Mean/Prop. Std. Dev. Mean/Prop. Std. Dev. 
Any collective petition (1=Yes; 0=No) 0.25 --- 0.21 --- 
Any collective petition > 50 participants (1=Yes; 0=No) 0.11 --- 0.07 --- 
Any protests and other non-institutionalized collective 
action (1=Yes; 0=No) 0.08 --- 0.11 --- 
Any protests > 50 participants (1=Yes; 0=No) 0.04 --- 0.06 --- 
Village out-migration ratio 0.28  0.18  0.32  0.19  
Land expropriation (1=Yes; 0=No) 0.11 --- 0.14 --- 
Lineage structure (monopoly or oligopoly village) 0.56 --- 0.56 --- 
Regular ancestral worship ceremony 0.35 --- 0.35 --- 
Village population (unit: 1,000 people) 1.58  0.98  1.58  1.08  
Proportion of working-age population  0.51  0.12  0.49  0.15  
Proportion of population with high school or higher 
education 0.13  0.12  0.13  0.11  
Per capita annual income (yuan) 2,808  1,556  3,525  2,181  
Number of enterprises 3.62  8.89  4.18  9.37  
Proportion of households with telephone 0.35 0.24 0.39 0.25 
Per capita household farmland (unit: mu) 6.86  10.48  6.57  9.29  
Per capita fiscal transfer from upper-level government 
(yuan) 20.31  39.83  44.95  59.43  
Villagers working in upper-level government (1=Yes; 
0=No) 0.62  --- 0.71  --- 
Note: N =113. The outcome variables (collective action) in 2005 and 2008 were shown. The independent variables in 2004 and 2007 were shown 
(one year lagged of the outcome variables, to be consistent with regression analysis). The mu is a traditional unit of land area in China. One mu is 












petition Protests Protests Protests Protests Protests 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 






Village out-migration ratio -0.14 -0.26* 0.28** 0.09 3.61* 0.18+ 0.38* 
 (0.15) (0.11) (0.11) (0.09) (1.68) (0.10) (0.17) 
Village out-migration ratio squared        -0.14 
       (0.39) 
Village out-migration ratio * Land 
expropriation      0.44*  
      (0.20)  
Land expropriation 0.15+ 0.08  0.09 0.06  0.61  0.12  0.04 
 (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.74) (0.11) (0.07) 
Strong lineage networks * Land 
expropriation 0.11 0.22* 0.24* 0.18* 4.20** -- 0.24* 
 (0.12) (0.09) (0.10) (0.07) (1.60) -- (0.10) 
Village population (log) -0.06 -0.12 -0.03 -0.07 2.09 -0.04 -0.03 
 (0.17) (0.12) (0.14) (0.10) (4.50) (0.14) (0.14) 
Proportion of working-age population  0.21  0.11 0.14  0.09 5.15+ 0.17 0.14 
 (0.21) (0.16) (0.18) (0.13) (3.07) (0.18) (0.18) 
Proportion of population with high 
school or higher education  -0.30  -0.34  0.07 0.33+  1.19  0.07  0.08 
 (0.29) (0.21) (0.25) (0.17) (3.36) (0.25) (0.25) 
Per capita annual income (log) -0.02  -0.06 -0.05 -0.06 -0.72 -0.06 -0.06 
 (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.05) (1.64) (0.08) (0.08) 
Number of enterprises -0.004 -0.00 -0.001 -0.00 -0.04 -0.00 -0.001 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.05) (0.004) (0.004) 
Proportion of households with 
telephone  0.08  0.09+  0.13*  0.14+  1.15  0.15  0.11 
 (0.14) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (1.54) (0.09) (0.09) 
Per capita household farmland (log) -0.04 -0.03 -0.07 -0.10* -0.47 -0.08 -0.07 
	 6 
 (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.80) (0.07) (0.07) 
Per capita fiscal transfer from upper-
level government (log) -0.03 -0.003 -0.01 0.003 -0.33 -0.01 -0.004 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.36) (0.02) (0.02) 
Villagers working in upper-level 
government 0.02 0.04 -0.02 0.07 -1.16 -0.01 -0.02 
 (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (1.24) (0.07) (0.07) 
Collective action in village (previous 
year) 0.32*** 0.12** 0.24*** 0.15*** 2.15*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 
 (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.52) (0.04) (0.04) 
Year (ref. 2005)        
  2006 -0.004 -0.02 0.10*  0.03 1.46* 0.10* 0.09* 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.63) (0.05) (0.05) 
  2007 -0.001 -0.01 0.12*  0.01 1.28+ 0.12* 0.12* 
 (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.69) (0.05) (0.05) 
  2008 0.002 -0.01 0.07  0.003 0.04 0.07 0.06 
 (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (1.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
Constant 0.03 -0.36 -0.03  0.16  -0.02 0.04 
 (0.87) (0.63) (0.74) (0.52)  (0.74) (0.76) 
N 452 452 452 452 248 452 452 
† p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001         















Table 3. Village-level Fixed-effect Regressions of Protests, 2005-2008, Rural China 
 
 Protests Protests Protests 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 All All Size>50 
Village out-migration ratio  0.12 0.09 0.02 
 (0.17) (0.14) (0.11) 
Village out-migration ratio * Strong lineage 
networks  0.29*   
 (0.14)   
Village out-migration ratio * Regular lineage 
activities  0.49* 0.35* 
  (0.23) (0.16) 
Land expropriation 0.07 0.06 0.08* 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) 
Village population (log) -0.02 -0.01 -0.04 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.10) 
Proportion of working-age population 0.15 0.12 0.09 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.14) 
Proportion of population with high school or 
higher education  0.04 0.08 0.46* 
 (0.25) (0.25) (0.20) 
Per capita annual income (log) -0.07 -0.06 -0.07 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.06) 
Number of enterprises -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) 
Proportion of households with telephone  0.13+  0.14+ 0.15 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) 
Per capita household farmland (log) -0.06 -0.07 -0.10* 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) 
Per capita fiscal transfer from upper-level 
government (log) -0.01 -0.01 0.003 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Villagers working in upper-level government -0.02 -0.004 0.08 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) 
	 8 
Collective action in village (previous year) 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.17*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) 
Year (ref. 2005)    
  2006 0.10* 0.10* 0.03 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) 
  2007 0.12* 0.12* 0.01 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) 
  2008 0.06 0.07 0.004 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) 
Constant 0.10 -0.004 -0.12 
 (0.74) (0.74) (0.55) 
† p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001    


















Appendix A. Number of Rural-Urban Migrants and Public Protests in China 
	
 
Source: Hu, Hu, and Wang (2010); Herd, Koen, and Reutersward (2010); and Wedeman (2009) 


















































































Appendix B. Land Expropriation as a Leading Source of Rural Unrest 
 
In recent years, rural China has been swept by increasing collective resistance (O’Brien and Li 
2006; Bernstein and Lü 2008; Cai 2010). The primary trigger of collective resistance is local 
government expropriation of peasants’ land (Yu 2007). After the central government abolished 
agricultural taxes in the early 2000s, land expropriations replaced tax burdens as the leading 
cause of collective resistance (Kennedy 2007). In land expropriations, local cadres (village or 
higher-level officials) dispossess farmers of their land, often by force, pay them far below market 
value, and pocket the lion’s share of the profits for themselves.  
 
Abusive land practices are partly a result of the administrative and fiscal decentralization 
that have accompanied China’s economic reforms. Administrative decentralization has led to 
declining effectiveness in the central state’s control over local society, creating opportunities for 
official malfeasance against powerless peasants (Guo 2001). Fiscal decentralization exacerbates 
this tendency by forcing local governments to generate most of their revenues. Coupled with 
booming land values, local officials have come to rely on land expropriations for revenue 
generation, typically leasing out land use rights for nonagricultural purposes (Wong 1997). Land 
expropriation has gradually become the main business of local governments throughout the 
country, providing between 20% and 70% of local governments’ administrative budgets (Lin and 
Ho 2005; Su, Zhao, and Tao 2013). Fiscal and administrative decentralization are compounded 
by pressures on local governments to demonstrate local economic growth and industrialization, 
which involve land conversions for infrastructure building and commercial use (Van Rooij 
2007). 
 
The problem of abusive land expropriation results from a lack of transparency in land 
property rights, as the owner of agricultural land in China is the “collective.” This legal 
ambiguity has given the local state wide latitude to claim itself as the de jure owner of rural land, 
while peasants are deprived of nonagricultural developmental rights on their own land (Lin and 
Ho 2005). Under such a system, land expropriation has to be initiated by local governments, 
which decide not only where and how much land is to be appropriated but also the level of 
compensation (Su et al. 2013). County governments often set land development plans and 
propose terms for land expropriation. The township governments then carry out negotiations 
with village cadres (who represent the “collectives”), and together they coerce farmers to accept 
government-set terms, which come with little or no compensation. Local governments then lease 
the land to commercial land developers at the (much higher) market price. The profit is 
misappropriated by different levels of cadres. In this process, village cadres often develop 
entrenched interests in colluding with upper-level authorities to depress peasants’ compensation 









Appendix C.  Scatter Diagram of Village Lineage Structure 
 
 
Note: Monopoly villages are dominated by a single lineage, which accounts for more than 42% of 
households. Oligopoly villages are dominated by a few large lineage groups, with no one group able to 
claim substantially larger numbers than the other two. In these villages, the three largest lineage groups 
account for more than 53% of households. Mixed villages comprise families from many different descent 
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Appendix D. Descriptive Statistics of Variables in the Analysis 
 
Descriptive statistics of village-level variables in the first and last year of inclusion in the 
analysis appear in Table 1. From 2005 through 2008, the percentage of villages experiencing 
collective petitions decreased from 25% to a little over 21%. The decline holds for collective 
petitions with more than 50 participants. The percentage of villages experiencing protests 
increased from 8% to 11% during the same period. The growth of protests with more than 50 
participants was more modest. These patterns should be interpreted with caution because events 
that occurred toward the end of 2008 (after the survey) may not have been recorded. Yet, 
comparing the trend in petitions and protests during the same period still reveals a diverging 
pattern.  
 
Regarding the independent variables, which were lagged by one year from the dependent 
variables (in 2004 and 2007), we see that the proportion of migrant workers increased from 28% 
to 32%. Land expropriation also became increasingly common in sample villages. As for lineage 
structure, almost 56% of the villages were embedded in strong lineage networks. About 35% of 
the villages held regular ancestral worship ceremonies. The average village population size was 
1,575 in 2004 and remained similar in 2007. The proportion of the working-age population 
declined slightly, by about 2%, reflecting population aging that loomed large across China. 
 
Village educational level and per capita annual income, while improving over time, 
remained quite low. This is consistent with the widely-documented poor socioeconomic 
development in rural China. As for economic structure, the sample villages averaged 3.6 
enterprises in 2004. The number increased to 4.2 by 2007. Also increased was the telephone 
prevalence in villages, which reflects telecommunication development in the countryside. For 
land resources, there was a decline in per capita household farmland, partly resulting from the 
nationwide conversion of farmland to nonagricultural purposes. Fiscal transfers from upper-level 
governments doubled during the same period. Finally, 62% of sample villages had someone 




















Appendix E. Village Fixed-effects Models Predicting Out-migration Based on Land 
Expropriation and Collective Action, 2005-2008, Rural China 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Land expropriation in previous year 0.05*   
 (0.02)   
Collective petition in previous year  0.01  
    (0.01)  
Protest in previous year   0.001 
   (0.02) 
* p<0.05    
Note: N = 452. Standard Errors are in Parentheses. Other control variables are omitted and 
are the same as those presented in Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
